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Making sequential decisions to harvest rewards is a notoriously difficult problem. One difficulty is that the real world is not
stationary and the reward expected from a contemplated action may depend in complex ways on the history of an animal’s
choices. Previous functional neuroimaging work combined with principled models has detected brain responses that correlate
with computations thought to guide simple learning and action choice. Those works generally employed instrumental
conditioning tasks with fixed action-reward contingencies. For real-world learning problems, the history of reward-harvesting
choices can change the likelihood of rewards collected by the same choices in the near-term future. We used functional MRI to
probe brain and behavioral responses in a continuous decision-making task where reward contingency is a function of both
a subject’s immediate choice and his choice history. In these more complex tasks, we demonstrated that a simple actor-critic
model can account for both the subjects’ behavioral and brain responses, and identified a reward prediction error signal in
ventral striatal structures active during these non-stationary decision tasks. However, a sudden introduction of new reward
structures engages more complex control circuitry in the prefrontal cortex (inferior frontal gyrus and anterior insula) and is not
captured by a simple actor-critic model. Taken together, these results extend our knowledge of reward-learning signals into
more complex, history-dependent choice tasks. They also highlight the important interplay between striatum and prefrontal
cortex as decision-makers respond to the strategic demands imposed by non-stationary reward environments more
reminiscent of real-world tasks.
Citation: Li J, McClure SM, King-Casas B, Montague PR (2006) Policy Adjustment in a Dynamic Economic Game. PLoS ONE 1(1): e103. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0000103
INTRODUCTION
Knowing how to behave adaptively reduces, in most circum-
stances, to knowing the consequences of available actions, or,
how much reward each action will garner on average. Practically
speaking, this is a daunting problem. This is particularly so since
the reward associated with different actions depends on a wide
variety of factors such as one’s history of actions, the behavior of
competitors, and even stochastic changes in the environment
through time. For example, a bee’s decision to harvest nectar
from one flower has the inevitable consequence of decreasing the
returns from that flower and increasing the returns from non-
sampled flowers (the nectar levels can recover). In foraging
theory, if the amount of available prey (i.e. reward) is greater
than the appetite of the predators then the food supply will
increase [1]. Sudden unexpected shocks can also have significant
effects on the costs and benefits associated with different actions.
In general, the reward available in the future depends in complex
ways on a possibly overwhelming variety of environmental
factors [2–3].
Despite this apparent complexity of action-reward relationships
presented by the world, most work in neuroscience and psychology
has focused on fixed action-reward dependencies and studied
the change of action-reward contingencies in block design
paradigms such as Wisconsin Card-sorting task (WCST), reversal
learning paradigms and extinction paradigm where in certain
block of trials the action-reward contingency is fixed [4–6]. This
trend persists in recent neuroimaging studies in humans, in which
operant learning paradigms have been studied extensively [7–16,
but see 17]. These studies suggested that brain areas associated
with the mesolimbic dopamine system (i.e. striatal structures,
prefrontal cortex) play an important role in reward learning and
action selection [18–21].
In this paper, we study changes in action selection reflective of
changes in reward expectation in a series of tasks in which earned
reward depends in complex ways on previous actions. The
rationale of this study was to fit each subject’s behavior through
time with a continuous error-based learning model (e.g. actor-
critic model) [5,9–14] to predict subject’s consequent action
selection and correlated brain activity in a series of tasks where
reward contingency is a function of both subject’s immediate
choice and choice history. We then asked how subject responded
to unexpectedly introduced new reward structures since subjects
are required to develop different strategies for these reward
structures and usually the adjustment of strategies correspond to
increasingly exploratory actions by the subjects; hence they would
give us opportunities to observe the interplay between control
signals in striatum and prefrontal cortex during the switches of
periods when action-reward dependencies vary slowly through
time and periods where subject’s behavior becomes more variable
and depends less on previous experience.
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RESULTS
The experimental design and subjects’ performance in these tasks
has been described previously [9,22–23]. We reviewed subjects’
behavioral tendencies, and note that all of the subjects performed
in accord with these summaries on each task individually, and
switched behavioral strategies rapidly when the tasks were
switched in our current manipulation.
MSRRO task (Matching ShoulderRRising Optimum)
In both the matching shoulders and rising optimum tasks, subjects
have a strong tendency to perform near the crossing point in the
reward functions (see Figure 1B legend for detail). This can be
understood by considering how earned reward changes near the
crossing point. Assuming that subjects choose A at the crossing
point, the percent allocation to A (%A) will increase, resulting in
decreased subsequent earned reward for selecting A (Figure 1B).
Reward can be increased by switching to choice B, which also
decreases the percent allocation to A, returning subjects to the
crossing point. The converse sequence of events occurs if B is
initially selected. As long as subjects tend to select in accord with
which choice is expected to produce the greatest immediate
reward (Herrnstein called this melioration, [3,24]), then they will
perform at the crossing point in the reward functions (,33%
allocation to A) in both the MS and RO tasks.
In the MS task, performing at the crossing point is the optimal
solution [9]. However, in the RO task it is grossly sub-optimal. If
subjects were to select button A on every choice in the RO task,
they would experience a temporary decrease in earned reward that
would subsequently reverse to produce the maximum average
return (Figure 1B). This optimal policy (selecting A only) is an
unstable equilibrium point in subjects’ action selection policy due
to the fact that at high allocation to A, choices to B produce
greater immediate reward (Figure 1C). In the MSRRO task,
subjects show evidence for both behavioral equilibria after the
reward structure switch. They began performing near the crossing
point, showing a temporary excursion to greater allocation to A
(%A), and then reverted again to performing near the crossing
point (Figure 2A).
FRRPR task (Flat return R Pseudorandom)
Regardless of the pattern of choices in the FR and PR tasks, the
average earned reward will be the same (Figure 1D, dot line;
Figure 2A). As in MS and RO, the FR reward structure possesses
a crossing point in the reward functions that acts as a stable
selection strategy (Figure 1D).
Subjects always performed the PR task immediately after the
FR task. Furthermore, we configured the reward returns in PR so
that the mean and variance in rewards that subjects experienced in
PR task were equal to what the subjects earned on the FR task
(Figure 1D). Unlike the FR task, reward in the PR paradigm was
randomly determined and was not dependent on the subjects’
choices (randomly drawn from a uniform distribution). Under
these conditions (PR), subjects tend to perform randomly, evenly
distributing their choices between A and B. The transition from
performing near the crossing point in the FR task (,40%
allocation to A) to equally distributing choice in the PR task
(,50% allocation to A) occurs at variable delays across subjects
(see below for discussion).
Reinforcement learning model of reward learning
Reward learning requires monitoring the expected reward for the
available actions (A and B), and biasing choices in favor of the
action with highest expected reward. We modeled this process
using the two reinforcement learning models described above
(Figure 2B). The sigmoid model assumes that subjects tend to
select the choice associated with the greatest model weight (i.e.
more likely to selected A when wA.wB). Furthermore, the
probability that subjects select the choice with the greater
estimated weight is expected to scale with the difference in
weights (wA–wB), while the e-greedy method assumes a probability
of 1-e/2 to the choice with bigger weight (w*). To test these
predictions, we calculated wA–wB at the time of every choice and
arranged choices in order of increasing weight difference for the
sigmoid action selection method. We then compared the observed
probability of selecting A (PA) by subjects with the probability
predicted by the logistic decision function (Green, Figure 2B). For
all 4 reward structures, this analysis revealed a strong correlation
between observed and estimated probabilities of selecting choice A
(MS: r = 0.97, RO: r = 0.99, FR: r = 0.97, PR: r = 0.97). For the e-
greedy method, we assigned individual subject’s probability to the
choice associated with bigger weight to be 1-e/2 and probability
for the other choice is thus e/2. We then arranged choices in order
of increasing probability of choosing a specific choice (A or B) and
then compared the observed probability of selecting A (PA) by
subjects with that predicted by the e-greedy decision function
(Pink, Figure 2B). This analysis revealed a similar fitting as the
softmax action selection method (MS: r = 0.97, RO: r = 0.99, FR:
r = 0.95, PR: r = 0.99) both in behavioral fitting and further neural
correlates mapping.
Neural correlates of prediction error
Reinforcement learning model states that learning signals (pre-
diction error) are used to update and monitor the value of choices.
In our experiment, we used prediction errors estimated from the
model and applied it as one of the regressors in a general linear
model (GLM) to imaging data. We find that the prediction error
signal estimated from two methods (softmax action selection and e-
greedy) correlates with activity in the ventral striatum in both of
our tasks with different reward structures (Figure 3).
Correlation with reward prediction error
The reinforcement learning model fits to the behavioral data
provide estimates of the reward prediction error experienced after
every choice. These prediction errors were used to produce
regressors that were further fit to subjects’ functional imaging data.
In the FRRPR task, the BOLD signal in regions of the ventral
putamen correlated significantly with estimated prediction error
signals (p,0.005, uncorrected) using both methods (softmax and e-
greedy). However, at a threshold of p,0.005 (uncorrected), we find
that no areas other than visual cortex are significantly correlated
with estimated prediction error signals in the matching shoulders to
rising optimum (MSRRO) task. We reasoned that the lack of
correlation with estimated prediction error in this task may result
from the fact that the large negative prediction error and prolonged
recovery phase produced by the change in reward paradigm
(Figure 2A, Figure 3, blue and red traces) may dominate the overall
fitting. To test this, we excluded the period of time encompassing
the first 25 choices following the onset and switch in reward
structures from the analysis. With this correction, BOLD signals in
ventral putamen correlated significantly with estimated prediction
error signals from both methods (p,0.001, uncorrected). This result
suggests BOLD signals in ventral striatum (putamen) can be
predicted by prediction errors (PE) when action-reward dependen-
cies vary slowly through time where PE fluctuates around 0 (Table 1,
Figure 3), but not in phases where subject’s behavior becomes more
variable and is less dependent on previous experience.
Non-Stationary Reward Learning
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Figure 1. Experimental design. (A) Subjects were engaged in two decision-making tasks in which they were instructed to choose from one of two
actions (A or B) with the goal of obtaining and maintaining maximum earned reward as indicated by a centrally located reward bar. (B) Example of
reward structure: Central bar height (reward) depends on two variables: 1) current decision (A or B, Red and Blue trace correspondingly) and 2) the
percentage of choice A (%A) made over the past 20 trials (x-axis). The initial %A is set to be 50%. In cases in which participants chose choice A in more
than 33% of the previous 20 trials, a B choice results in greater reward than an A choice. In cases in which participants chose choice A in less than 33%
of the previous 20 trials, an A choice results in greater reward than a B choice. Thus, to the right of the crossing-point of the two reward functions, ‘B’
choices both increase reward and move subjects to left on the x-axis. However, as subjects move left past the crossing-point, A choices begin to yield
greater reward than B choices and move subjects right on the x-axis. In this example, the crossing-point represents the optimal allocation to A, as the
average return at all other allocations is less than at the crossing-point of the two reward structure (indicated by the dashed line). (C) In the first task,
participants made 125 decisions with reward determined by the matching shoulders (MS) structure (left panel), followed by 125 decisions with
reward given by the rising optimum (RO) structure (right panel). (D) In a second task, participants began with the flat returns (FR) structure (left panel)
and switched to a pseudorandom (PR) task (right panel). In the FR task, all choice strategies yield the same average return (dashed line). In the PR
condition, reward was randomly determined independent of choice but was set to give the same mean and variance of rewards as was earned in the
FR structure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000103.g001
Non-Stationary Reward Learning
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Figure 2. Experienced rewards and modeled behavioral response. (A) The switch from matching shoulders (MS) to rising optimum (RO) reward
structures was signaled by a large decrease in immediate reward return (,60%). However, the switch from the flat returns (FR) structure to the
pseudorandom (PR) condition did not elicit a similar change in experienced reward. Reward S.E. is indicated by vertical bars at each choice. (B)
Subject decisions were predicted using a reinforcement learning model with two different methods to determine the probability to choose a certain
action (e-greedy method and sigmoid method). For both methods, we assume that subjects maintained independent estimates of the reward
expected for each choice, A and B, and updated these values based on experienced rewards using the Rescorla-Wagner learning algorithm. Choices
were assumed to be 1) probabilistically related to choice values according to a sigmoid function (softmax method, green curve) or 2)have a fixed
probability of 1-e/2 for choice associated with bigger weight (e-greedy method, pink curve). Panel B indicates the relationships between predicted
and actual choices. Decisions were binned (x-axis) based on predicted likelihood that subjects would choose A. Y-values indicate the actual average
allocation to A for all choices within each bin. Linear regression shows there is a strong correlation between predicted and actual choices. (MS:
r = 0.97, RO: r = 0.99, FR: r = 0.97, PR: r = 0.97 for softmax method; MS: r = 0.97, RO: r = 0.99, FR: r = 0.95, PR: r = 0.99 for e-greedy method). e-greedy
method restrict each subject only have one probability to choose certain choice (A or B) over 250 trials, while sigmoid method allows subject to
generate different probability to choose specific choice for each trial in the 250 trial task. This is why e-greedy method does not cover all the spectrum
of X-axis as sigmoid method does.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000103.g002
Non-Stationary Reward Learning
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These results are further confirmed by fitting our learning
model to each of the 4 sub-tasks (MS, RO, FR, and PR)
independently. Prediction errors generated in this manner,
omitting periods immediate after the introduction of new reward
structures (25 trials, Figure S3, red and blue), correlate with
BOLD signals in the same area of the ventral striatum in each of
the four sub-tasks (Figure S3). This indicates that, when behavior is
relatively stable, the ventral striatum is engaged to dynamically
track ongoing reward estimation errors. Overall, these results
correspond well to a recent report that prediction error-like signals
occur in the striatum in an operant learning paradigm [12].
Brain activity during periods of unexpected reward
structure switches
We hypothesized that the unexpected salient events can possibly
act to indicate possible changes in reward contingency or reward
paradigm and they may trigger further exploratory behaviors by
Figure 3. Activity in ventral striatum correlated to prediction errors with two different models. For each choice, a prediction error was generated
by comparing the reward experienced by the subject with the current modeled weight value for the choice. Traces in figure 3 indicate the average
prediction error, d(t), across subjects for two different tasks. Neural activity corresponding to prediction errors that were generated from
independently fitting reinforcement model to our 2 different tasks (MSR RO and FRR PR) using two different methods (softmax and e-greey) was
identified though general linear model (GLM) analyses. Peak activities for left and right striatum are located at MNI [212, 8, 8] and [24, 12, 24] for
MSRRO task and [216, 8, 24] and [12, 8, 0] for FRRPR task using softmax method. Activity in ventral striatum correlates with the magnitude of
prediction errors in the exploitation periods of both tasks (red: p,0.001; yellow: p,0.005, uncorrected).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000103.g003
Non-Stationary Reward Learning
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subjects. There were three time points in the behavioral tasks that
reliably signaled significant changes in reward paradigms which
can also be confirmed from deviated prediction error signals
(Figure 3). We consider brain areas that are activated in all of these
instances as involved in abstract rules monitoring and detection
and their activities can be triggered by salient events (dramatic
immediate reward change in our case, [25–26]) and further help to
promote more exploratory behaviors by subjects in order to
determine more optimal strategies for current reward structure.
We identified these areas using a conjunction analysis (intersection
of areas significantly correlated at p,0.001, uncorrected for
multiple comparisons, in each instance, [27]). The three points
include the beginning of both tasks (first choices in MS and first
choices in FR), and the instant when the task paradigm switched
from MS to RO. In the MSRRO task, subjects invariably played
near the crossing point in the MS task (Figure S1), which resulted
in a significant (60%) drop in earned reward when the task
switched to RO reward structure. This change caused subjects to
alter (even if briefly) behavioral strategy (Figure S2).
Three brain areas were identified by the conjunction analysis
including the bilateral anterior insula and a region in the inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) (See Table 2 for detailed description). The
region identified in the insula has been implicated in responding to
cognitive conflict and behavior inhibition [21,28]. The other
region we identified lies on the IFG and extends into the frontal
operculum (BA 44, Figure 4). This region has been identified
under conditions requiring increased attention and changes in
behavior [29].
Another time point in our experiment that might be associated
with exploration is the task switch in the FRRPR paradigm.
Subjects changed from performing near the crossing point (,40%
A%) in the FR task to random selecting behavior in the PR task
(,50% A%) (Figure S2). There are two differences between the
task switch in FRRPR and MSRRO that underlie why we did
not include it in the conjunction analysis. First, in FRRPR,
subjects switch to a null behavioral strategy (random play). Thus it
is unclear to what degree subjects are exploring new behavioral
strategies as opposed to simply omitting strategic play. Secondly,
the reward structure switch in FRRPR task does not produce as
dramatic a signal of changed reward contingencies as in the
MSRRO paradigm. In MSRRO task, the bar height decreases
approximately 60% at the task switch. For FRRPR task, the mean
Table 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Areas of activation positively related to prediction error (MSR RO task, logistic fitting)
peak MNI
region of activation T Z x y z voxels
left putamen 3.65 3.40 212 8 8 11
right putamen 4.28 3.90 24 12 24 10
occipital 4.39 3.99 4 288 20 71
Parahippocampal gyrus 4.86 4.33 24 0 212 5
Inferior parietal cortex 3.76 3.48 232 244 44 5
Table 2.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Areas of activation positively related to onset and switch of reward structures
peak MNI
region of activation T Z x y z voxels
left IFG 6.11 5.19 248 4 28 21
right IFG 7.61 6.07 44 8 28 48
left insula 6.00 5.11 232 24 4 28
right insula 4.63 4.16 36 20 8 18
left putamen 5.83 5.00 28 4 0 18
right putamen 6.98 5.71 12 4 0 15
midbrain 6.47 5.41 24 228 24 44
occipital 7.95 6.25 232 288 16 639
Regions with 15 or greater significant voxels were identified using T-tests, p,.0001 (uncorrected).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000103.t002..
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Areas of activation positively related to prediction error (FRRRO task, logistic fitting)
peak MNI
region of activation T Z x y z voxels
left putamen 3.77 3.50 216 8 24 7
right putamen 3.70 3.44 12 8 0 4
Regions with 3 or greater significant voxels were identified using T-tests, p,.001 (uncorrected).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000103.t002..
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and variance in reward were unchanged after the reward structure
switch. Subjects may therefore require more time to discover and
respond to the change in reward contingencies and the time for
each subject to discover and respond could vary across individuals.
This is further confirmed by the fact that reward prediction error
signal estimated from both of our models does not indicate any
significant changes during the switch from FR to PR reward
structure (Figure 3). Consistent with this, activity does increase in
the area of PFC identified by the conjunction analysis following
the switch in FRRPR. However, the amplitude is reduced and the
duration of activity is prolonged relative to MSRRO task. This is
the expected outcome were subjects to discover and respond to the
task switch at more delayed and variable times.
DISCUSSION
Using a continuous decision-making task with four different
dynamic reward structures underlying subjects’ action-outcome
contingencies, we found in this paper that differential involvement
of brain areas in action selection and learning during different time
periods of the task. Two model-based regression analyses showed
BOLD activities in the ventral striatal structure correlate with
prediction error signal. However, a sudden introduction of new
reward structures engages more complex control circuitry in the
prefrontal cortex (inferior frontal gyrus and anterior insula) and is
not captured by a simple actor-critic model. Separately, these two
systems have been the subject of numerous investigations of
decision-making. The first of these systems, the ventral striatum, is
believed to be involved specifically in maintaining and updating
the expected reward value of actions. This is accomplished
through interactions with the mesolimbic dopamine system which
activates in accord with ongoing reward prediction error signals
[18]. In the striatum, dopamine is known to modulate synaptic
plasticity [19] allowing for the activity of these neurons to encode
action value [30]. Functional MRI studies have demonstrated that
the striatum is clearly involved in biasing action selection in accord
with current action values [13], and that activity in this structure
changes in accord with ongoing prediction errors [10,31–32]. Our
findings show that these results hold during periods of conditional
action-selection learning in each of the four different reward
structures when, presumably, the striatum is the primary de-
terminant of behavior. Our results distinguished from previous
studies by using different underlying reward functions originally
derived from Herrnstein’s matching law [3,22,24] that reward
associated with each choice depends not only on the current
Figure 4. Inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and anterior insula respond to reward structure switches. (A)The IFG activity was identified by a conjunction
analysis as brain responds to the introduction of new reward structures. (B) Relative BOLD signal changes of IFG in four different sub-tasks are
estimated by general linear model (GLM). Activities at the onsets of reward structure MS, RO, FR are significantly bigger than zero (p,0.001, one
sample t-test). (C) BOLD signal changes were further confirmed by a region of interest (ROI) analysis in the four sub-tasks. These periods correspond
to initially learning the reward structure of the tasks (blue) and adapting to changes in reward structure in the middle of the MSRRO task (red).
Qualitatively equivalent results were also obtained for the anterior insula.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000103.g004
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choice but also subject’s previous choice history, while most of the
previous studies adopted fixed action-reward contingencies para-
digms [11–14,33]. Animals have to face a non-stationary world
and the amount of reward expected from a contemplated action
depends in complex ways on the history of an animal’s choices.
This can dramatically change the likelihood of rewards collected
by the same choices in the near-term future, and our result
indicates similar neural correlates are required in reward-learning
tasks more reminiscent of real-world environment.
During periods where immediate reward return fluctuates
dramatically (at the beginnings of both tasks, and in the middle of
MS-.RO task), activity in the striatum is not well captured by
reinforcement learning models, suggesting that the striatum is not
strongly involved in action selection during these periods. In these
periods, brain activity is increased in two areas of the prefrontal
cortex: in the inferior frontal gyrus as well as bilaterally in the
anterior insula. The insula has primarily been implicated as
responding to disgust, pain, and other aversive stimuli [34–36]. In
terms of decision-making tasks such as ours, the insula has also
been found to be activated by changes in reward contingencies
[21]). Together, these findings have been taken to suggest that the
anterior insula (as well as part of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex) is
also involved in inhibiting old action-selection patterns. The IFG,
by contrast, is much more strongly linked to maintaining and
switching between action strategies [37]. As an example, a recent
study by Schmitz and colleagues [29] investigated which brain
systems are involved when subjects are required to lift varying
weights. When the required motor plans were regular (either
because the weight was constant or alternated regularly between
two values), the level of activity observed in the IFG was
significantly less than when the motor plan had to be constantly
reformulated (random sequence of weight change). Another study
by Cools et al. [38] demonstrated that BOLD signal change in the
lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) was observed during the lower-
order switching between concrete objects and higher-order
switching between abstract task rules. We interpret our observed
IFG activity accordingly: during periods when higher order action
strategies are in greater flux, increased activity results in the IFG.
The overall task requirements, to maximize earned reward and to
select from two constant actions, were unchanged. Given this, it is
perhaps not surprising that we find activity changes restricted to
posterior prefrontal cortex. Recent experiments have led to the
hypothesis that there may be a rostro-caudal hierarchical
organization in lateral prefrontal cortex such that higher-order
task goals are maintained in more anterior aspects of PFC [20].
We hypothesize that the IFG is specifically involved in maintaining
and changing between action strategies within a set of task
requirements.
Involvement of both frontal and striatal systems in
decision-making under uncertainty
Numerous recent reports have identified the striatum and
prefrontal cortex as two parallel, and often times competing,
systems that interact to guide behavior [25–26,33,35,39–42]. The
current prevalence of studies highlighting the competition between
these two systems is probably more a reflection of what constitutes
a hallmark problem in economics and philosophy than the general
nature of interaction of these two systems [43]. Daw and
colleagues [33] discussed a possible complimentary interaction
between the striatum and prefrontal cortex in which control of
behavior is given to the system which is best suited to the current
problem. Other hypotheses suggest that dopaminergic signals from
ventral tegmental area (VTA) serve as a ‘‘gating’’ mechanism to
the prefrontal cortex (PFC) to update goal representation and
change action selection policy [25–26, 41, 44–45). Interestingly,
a recent paper by Pasupathy and Miller [42] showed that in
a conditional visual-motor learning task, rapid changes of striatum
activity as well as a slower trend changes in the prefrontal cortex
have been observed. The authors interpreted their result to
support both hypotheses. In our task, the co-occurrence of PFC
activity and dramatic changes in prediction error signals (Figure. 4)
suggest that learning in the prefrontal cortex might be triggered by
midbrain dopaminergic signals as the dopamine-gating hypothesis
indicates [25–26]. The positive BOLD signals also detected at
brain areas such as visual cortex, midbrain (locus ceruleus) and
striatum (Table 2) during the introduction of MS, RO and FR
tasks imply multiple brain mechanisms, which are responsible for
novelty or salience detection, arousal increasing and attention
direction [46–47], might also be recruited to detect and further
respond to the reward structure changes.
Involvement of frontostriatal circuitry in
exploration-exploitation tradeoff
The exploration-exploitation dilemma necessarily arises when
decisions are made without complete knowledge of the world.
Choices can be made that deliver the maximum reward based on
what is currently known (exploitation) or to try unknown alternatives
in the hope of discovering better actions, a strategy known as
exploration. Exploration has the potential to greatly improve
performance as it allows for the discovery of optimal actions.
However, it can also be very costly. If the optimal strategy were
already known, then exploration will only serve to reduce rewards.
Any decision-maker will have to face the exploration-exploitation
balance dilemma. Animals need to keep a stable behavioral
strategy (exploitation) while in the meantime maintaining the
flexibility to adapt to new environment once enough salient
evidence has accumulated indicating previous strategy is no longer
optimal. In our task, we specifically avoided studying how
exploration and exploitation trade off as behavioral strategies in
this experiment (but see Yu and Dayan [48], [31,49]). Instead, we
hypothesize that control of behavior switches between the striatum
and prefrontal cortex as the demands for these two behavioral
strategies change. In our task, we manipulated the experimental
design to create choice situations that reliably 1) elicit exploitation
responses and 2) demonstrate reward paradigm change and
further demand more explorative behaviors in a continuous
decision making paradigm. This allowed us to directly target those
brain areas involved separately in exploration and exploitation. As
a result, our data might suggest that different weightings of
striatum-prefrontal cortex circuits may dominate people’s strategy
selection.
These findings should open the door to investigations of how
prefrontal and striatal systems function together to direct people’s
actions during decision-making under uncertainty.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
A total of 46 subjects were recruited for this study (22 male). All
subjects were right hand dominant and were on average 32 years
old (S.D.69.3). Subjects had no history of psychiatric illness.
Informed consent was obtained using a consent form approved by
the Baylor College of Medicine Institutional Review Board.
Scanning was performed in a head-dedicated Siemens Allegra
scanner with field strength 3T. Prior to the experiment, high-
resolution T1-weight anatomical images (1 mm61 mm in-plane
resolution) were acquired to allow localization of functional
activity. Whole brain echo-planar images (EPI) were acquired in
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26 axial slices (3.463.464 mm width) parallel to the AC-PC line.
Images were acquired with a repetition time (TR) of 2s, an echo
time (TE) of 40ms, and flip angle of 90u.
Experimental Task
Subjects lay supine with their head in the scanner bore and
observed the rear-projected computer screen via a 45u mirror
mounted to the head coil. Choices were registered using two MRI-
compatible button boxes. Selections to A were made by pressing
any button with the left hand and selections to B by pressing any
button with the right hand for half number of the subjects and in
the reversed pattern for the other half. After each selection, the
central reward bar obtained a new height dependent on earned
reward. Following this, the buttons (A and B) on the screen were
disabled and turned gray for 1.25 s. Subjects were instructed that
they could not make further selection until the buttons on the
screen turned back to normal color from gray.
Subjects engaged in two repeated play, two-alternative decision-
making tasks in which they were instructed to choose from one of
two actions (A or B) with the goal of obtaining and maintaining
maximum earned reward (Figure 1A; [8,23]). The central bar
height (reward) is controlled by two variables: 1) Current choice
made (A or B), if the subject chooses A, then the reward received
will be along the red line, otherwise, the reward will be on the blue
line; 2) Subject’ choice history: the percentage of choice ‘‘A’’ (%A)
selected in the past 20 choices. The initial %A value is set to be
50%. As task proceeds, the %A is updated (a 20-choice moving
window) as a result of each choice (A or B) subjects made. The
tasks were modified for use in fMRI by pacing the rate at which
choices are made to no faster than one every 1.25 s. The mean
reaction time was slightly less than 2 s. Each task required subject
to make 250 selections. After the first 125 selections, the reward
structure was switched (Figure 1B, C). Subjects were not instructed
that these switches would occur. In the first task, the reward
structure was initially defined by the matching shoulders (MS)
paradigm and was then switched to the rising optimum (RO)
reward paradigm (MSRRO task; Figure. 1C). The other task
began with the flat returns (FR) paradigm and was switched to
pseudo-random (PR) returns at the switch (FRRPR task;
Figure. 1D). In all reward paradigms except pseudo-random,
earned reward depended on two variables: (1) the subject’s choice
(A or B; corresponding to red and blue reward curves in Figure 1C,
D, respectively), and (2) the percent of the last 20 choices made to
choice A (%A, allocation to A; x-axis on plots in Figure. 1B, C, D).
Allocation to A was set to 50% at the beginning of both tasks.
Data Analysis
Imaging data was analyzed using SPM2 [50] and xjView (http://
people.hnl.bcm.tmc.edu/cuixu/xjView/). Functional images were
realigned, corrected for slice timing, coregistered with a canonical
brain in MNI coordinates, resliced to 4x4x4mm and smoothed
with an 8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel prior to analysis.
The prediction error signal, d(t), determined by fitting the
behavioral data, was used to produce a regressor through
convolution with a canonical hemodynamic response kernel. To
find brain voxels sensitive to changes in reward paradigm, we used
a regressor with a single hemodynamic response function offset to
the time of reward structure switch (beginning of each reward
structure).
Regressors were fit independently to data from each voxel in the
functional brain images using standard linear model methods. A
random effects analysis was conducted by performing one-sample
t-tests over best fitting beta amplitudes produced by linear model
fitting. Brain areas are considered significantly activated that are
composed of at least 5 contiguous voxels significant at p,0.005
with peak significance in the cluster of at least p,0.001.
Behavior Fitting–Modeling
Subjects’ decision-making was modeled with a reinforcement
learning algorithm. We assume that subjects maintained in-
dependent estimates of the reward expected for each choice, A and
B, and updated these values based on experienced rewards. In
particular, we assume choice values (wA and wB) were updated
according to a Rescorla-Wagner learning algorithm.
We used two methods to assign probabilities to each choice: 1)
logistic method and 2) e-greedy method. In logistic method,
choices were assumed to be probabilistically related to choice
values according to a sigmoid function with slope m:
PA(t)~
emwA(t)
emwA(t)zemwB(t)
ð1Þ
While in e-greedy method, one of the two alternative choices
will be assigned with probability 1-e/2 if the weight associated with
that choice is bigger than the other and the probability of choosing
the other choice is thus e/2. When the weights associated with two
choices are equal, then one choice will be randomly assigned with
probability 1-e/2, the other e/2.
PA tð Þ~H wA tð Þ{wB tð Þð Þ  1{e=2ð Þz
H wB tð Þ{wA tð Þð Þ  e=2ð Þ;
ð2Þ
Where H(x) is a Heaviside step function and defined by
H(x)~
0 xv0
1=2 x~0
1 xw0
8><
>:
In both methods, for each choice (denote the choice by *), the
reward experienced by the subject r(t) was compared with the
current modeled weight value W*(t) to produce a prediction error
d(t):
d(t)~r(t){w(t) ð3Þ
The prediction error served as a learning signal that was used by
both methods to improve modeled action weights by an amount
governed by the learning ratel:
w(tz1)~w(t)zld(t); ð4Þ
The quality of both model fittings was determined by how well
they are able to account for the actual pattern of subjects’ choices.
This was quantified as the product of the modeled probabilities of
all of the subjects’ choices, the log likelihood estimate (LLE) (i.e. log
Pt P*(t)) in two models. Free parameters in sigmoid method
included the learning rate (l) and the slope of the sigmoid decision
function (m), while another two free parameters: the learning rate
(l) and greedy factor (e) are used in e-greedy method. Initial
weights for both methods were held such that wA=wB=0.5. The
models were fit so as to maximize LLE for each subject
individually using a simplex method. To avoid local minima in
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parameter fitting, fitting was initiated from 20 randomly de-
termined starting values and the best fit was taken across all final
parameter values. The learning rate was restricted to values
between 0 and 1; the sigmoid slope was restricted to positive values
and the greedy parameter (e) was restricted to values between 0 and
1.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Figure S1 Individual subject performance variability in both
tasks. These four panels represent how individual subject averagely
perform in 4 different reward structures (MS, RO, FR, PR).
Immediate reward subject receive from each choice they make
depends on two variables: 1) current decision (A or B, Red and
Blue trace correspondingly) and 2) the percentage of choice A
(%A) made over the past 20 trials (x-axis). Each subject’s average
behavior is represented by a triangle on each reward structure
plot. Most subject perform around the optimal strategy (cross point
of red and blue curve) in the MS task, while in RO task, subjects
tend to split along the %A and many subject were restricted to the
crossing point which is not the optimal strategy anymore. In FR
task, subjects were still slightly attracted by the crossing point while
in the PR task subjects were randomly distributed around the 50%
%A point.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000103.s001 (1.44 MB TIF)
Figure S2 Various behavioral responses subjects performed in
both tasks. Subjects quickly adjusted to the optimal strategy at the
beginning of both tasks (MS and FR). The switch from matching
shoulders (MS) to rising optimum (RO) reward structures was
signaled by a large decrease in immediate reward return (Fig. 2)
and could possibly trigger the more exploratory behavior in the
RO task. However, the switch from the flat returns (FR) structure
to the pseudorandom (PR) condition did not elicit a similar change
in experienced reward and thus although the general behavioral
patterns in FR and PR task are different (,40% %A in FR task
and ,%50 %A in PR task), there is no evidence indicating
a reliable exploratory phase in PR task. %A S.E. is indicated by
vertical bars at each choice.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000103.s002 (1.60 MB TIF)
Figure S3 Ventral striatum as the neural correlate of average
prediction error, d(t), across subjects for four different sub-tasks
using softmax method. Neural activity corresponding to prediction
errors generated from independently fitting the softmax re-
inforcement model to 4 sub-tasks (MS, RO, FR, PR). Activity in
ventral striatum correlates with the magnitude of prediction error
in each sub-task (MS, RO, FR, PR) (red: p,0.001; yellow:
p,0.005, uncorrected) when reward contingencies vary slowly
through time.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000103.s003 (3.82 MB TIF)
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